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Empirical work on the impact of rm performance and labor
market conditions on wages has departed from the basic theoret-
ical conjuncture that rms' ability to pay and workers possibili-
ties of nding jobs in the event of unemployment, are two impor-
tant determinants of individual wages. According to bargaining
models, individual wages are positively correlated to rm prots
and vary negatively with workers' unemployment risk. A posi-
tive correlation between prots and wages is also compatible to a
competitive model with friction. In addition, incentive theories
of wages and eciency-wage hypotheses suggest that high wages
lead to high prots.1 There is a body of empirical literature
dealing with the impact of prots on wages based on aggregated
data.2 The data used in these studies are aggregated on the
worker and/or the rm side suppressing within industry vari-
ation and/or neglecting worker heterogeneity.3 The estimated
elasticity of wages with respect to prots in these studies, based
on a number of varying data sources, is amazingly similar across
countries, ranging between 0.01 and 0.05.
The purpose of this study is to examine the extent of rent-
sharing and the impact of individual and aggregated unemploy-
ment risk on the wages of individual workers. We use a sample of
over 170,000 Swedish employees for 1991 and 1995 matched with
their employing rm's balance-sheet information. The matched
data contain detailed information on individual characteristics
1For bargaining models see Oswald (1982, 1985). For a positive correlation between
prots and wages in a competitive framework with frictions see Blanch
ower et al. (1996).
For eciency wage theories see Akerlof and Yellen (1986).
2See Katz and Summers (1989), and Blanch
ower et al. (1996) on the US. Abowd
and Lemieux (1993) and Christodes & Oswald (1992) use Canadian contract data. For
European studies see Blanch
ower et al. (1990), Holmlund and Zetterberg (1991), Nickell
et al. (1994), and Hildreth and Oswald (1997).
3Abowd et al.(1999) and Arai (1999) use microdata on wages and prots for the private
sector. Margolis and Salvanes (2001) examine microdata on males in manufacturing. The
data in Abowd et al. and Margolis and Salvanes do not include unemployment, while Arai
(1999) uses only regional unemployment on a small sample of employees with a limited
panel dimension.
1including individual unemployment experience from 1992-1995,
as well as annual balance-sheet information for the period 1987-
1995. These data are matched with the Swedish Establishment
Survey (APU) which contains explicit information on product
market competition and product demand elasticity.
The contribution of this paper is in providing evidence on the
impact of prots and unemployment risk on wages based on dis-
aggregated individual and rm data. As such, this study deals
explicitly with the problems of rm and worker heterogeneity
as well as the issue of endogeneity of prots. A novelty in this
paper is that the relationship between aggregate unemployment
risk and wages is estimated taking into account that marginal
workers have both lower wages and higher unemployment risk.
The results of our study imply a positive eect of prots on
wages that are robust across various model specications and
exist for both 1991 and 1995. The results for 1991 indicate that
individual wages are positively correlated to rm average prots
from 1987-1990. A similar pattern is observed regarding the
impact of prots for 1991-1994 on individual wages in 1995.
Our evidence provides strong support for the existence of
rent-sharing as this eect is found on wages for both 1991 and
1995, two periods characterized by very dierent business cy-
cle phases. The unemployment rate during the late 1980's in
Sweden was extremely low, less than 2 percent while the prof-
its reported for the 1991-1994 period re
ect rm performance
during the deepest recession in Swedish history since the 1930's.
The implied elasticities are between 0.008 and 0.025 in 1991 and
between 0.005 and 0.012 in 1995, falling within the range of pre-
viously reported elasticities using other sources of data in various
other countries. Moreover, we observe that 75% percent of the
eects of prots on wages are within industry eects indicating
that rent-sharing takes place mainly at local-level bargaining
in Sweden. The signicant impact of prots on wages remains
intact when we control for time-invariant individual and rm
2specic heterogeneity. Our elasticities imply that wage inequal-
ity in Sweden due to the spread in prots is as high as 14 percent
of mean wages in 1991 according to Lester's range of pay (Lester
(1952)).4
Reported elasticities may, however, be an underestimation
of the extent of rent-sharing due to the accounting relationship
between wages and prot implying that higher wages lead to
lower prots. On the other hand according to theories of incen-
tive pay and various versions of eciency wage theory, higher
pay implies higher prots. These problems can be dealt with
by using instruments for prots in estimation. Previous studies
have, apart from lagged prots, used instruments such as en-
ergy costs (Blanch
ower et al.(1996)) and import selling prices
(Abowd and Lemieux (1993)). Abowd and Lemieux report elas-
ticities that increase by 10 times when prots are instrumented.
Using employer-reported short term product market elasticity
and the number of competitors as instruments for prots yields
results indicating that our estimated elasticities are underesti-
mated. The elasticities implied by the IV-estimates suggest that
Lester's measure of wage inequality due to prots is as high as
50 percent of mean wages.
Finally we investigate the impact of individual heterogeneity
with respect to unemployment risk on wages. To our knowledge,
no previous study investigates the impact of unemployment risk
on wages at the individual and establishment level. Previous
wage curve studies usually do not include prots and use un-
employment measures aggregated in various dimensions - by in-
dustry, region or country (see Blanch
ower and Oswald (1994)).
We include individuals' unemployment records from 1992-1995
as well as aggregated individual unemployment experience, for
the same time period, at the rm and various industry levels in
our regressions. Results conrm a stable and negative correla-
4Lester's range of pay is calculated as the product of the elasticity of wages with respect
to prots and four standard deviations of prots (the range) divided by average prots.
3tion between unemployment and wages along with a signicant
positive eect of prots on wages.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Data are described
in Section 2 and the empirical setup is discussed in Section 3.
Basic results on the eect of prots on wages are reported in
Section 4 where we also report variation of rents across worker
groups as well as within and between industries. Individual
heterogeneity and endogeneity issues are analyzed in Section 5.
The relation between individual and aggregated unemployment
risk with wages is analyzed in Section 6 and, nally, the paper
is concluded in Section 7.
2 Data
The origin of the sample used for estimation in this study is the
1991 Swedish Level of Living Survey (LNU) which is a 1/1000
random sample of the Swedish population between the ages 18
and 65. All individuals in LNU 1991 are matched to their em-
ploying establishments by means of unique organization num-
bers. These establishments then form the basis of the Swedish
Establishment Survey (APU) in which a large number of admin-
istrative data for all individuals working in APU-establishments
1987, 1991, or 1995 are collected forming a larger individual sam-
ple.5 These data are matched to ocial balance sheet data for
the APU rms by means of the Swedish system of corporate
registration numbers.
Data on wages and job characteristics are from Statistics
Sweden as well as from data collected by the Central Organiza-
tion of Blue-Collar Workers (LO) and the Central Confederation
of Private Employers (SAF). Wages are computed as full-time
equivalent pre-tax monthly salaries. These data are matched
5To assure that our sample is representative, the sample is compared with another
randomly drawn sample of individuals in 1991 and 1995. Comparing sample means from
the two samples indicates no signicant dierences.
4with individual unemployment records for the period 1992-1995
from the AMS Event Database (AMS H andelsedatabas). Our
data allow us to track individuals from 1992 to 1995 and de-
ne a dichotomous variable equal to one when the individual is
registered as unemployed some time during this period and 0
otherwise. Furthermore we construct another variable equal to
the fraction of individuals at the establishment level who have
experienced unemployment during the 1992-1995 period. This
variable measures the aggregated unemployment risk at the rm
level. For a detailed description of the data, see Appendix.
Balance-sheet information is available for the period 1987-
1995. Before matching individuals to rms in the matched
worker-rm sample, those rms in the balance-sheet data that
were observed for less than two years or had less than 2 employ-
ees were removed.
As a measure for prots we use annual prots, after capi-
tal depreciation, per employee. This prot measure is clearly
observable for both the employer and employees as well as for
other parties outside the rm. This, together with the fact that
it is a widely used measure of rm performance, makes it a suit-
able variable for investigating the relationship between prots
and wages. Due to high variability in rm performance, we use
average prots over time as a measure of long-run protability.
3 Empirical Setup
Consider the following specication:
Wijt = c + X
0
ijt0 + Pijt1 + U
0
ijt2 + "ijt;
"ijt = i + j + t + uijt;
U
0




5where Wijt, Xijt, Pijt and Uijt denote wages, vectors of in-
dividual characteristics, average past prots and unemployment
risk variables for individual i in rm j during year t (= 1991;1995).
The individual characteristics used are age, gender, educational
level, labor market experience and seniority in the establish-
ment. The error components i, j and t are individual, rm
and time eects respectively and uijt is the random error term.
Cross-section estimation may suer from biases due to omit-
ted variables correlated with the prot measure. To deal with
this potential problem, we estimate dierence equations to ex-
amine the impact of changes in prots between the periods 1987-
1990 and 1991-1994 on changes in individual wages between 1991
and 1995. We do this for both individuals who are working in
the same establishments in 1991 and 1995 and for those who
changed employers between these years. The former controls for
time invariant individual and rm specic eects (i + j) ac-
counting for systematic sorting of individuals across rms, while
the latter only controls for individual eects (i).
Another important issue to consider is the endogeneity of
prots. Wages aect prots due to the accounting relationship.
This leads to an underestimation of the impact of prots on
wages. Moreover, according to incentive theories of wages, high
wages may lead to high prots. Our past four-year averages
of prot per employee reduces the potential simultaneity bias
between wages and prots. We deal with endogeneity of prots
by using various new instruments for prots in estimation on our
matched worker-rm data. Instruments include lagged prots, a
measure of product demand elasticity and a measure indicating
degree of competition in the product market. The latter two
instruments directly capture the existence of product market
rents.
An additional issue to consider is returns to capital. We deal
with this by examining the robustness of our results to inclusion
of controls for the capital-to-labor ratio (value of equipments
6per employee) and by comparing prots for rms with compara-
ble capital-to-labor ratios.6 We also investigate to what degree
rent-sharing varies across groups of workers and takes place be-
tween industries, between rms within industries and between
individuals within industries and rms.
4 Eects of Prots on Wages
Results reported in Table 1 indicate that there are positive and
signicant eects of rms' ability to pay, measured in terms of
average past four year accounting prots per employee, on in-
dividual wages in 1991 and 1995.7 The implied elasticities for
1991 range between 0.008 and 0.025 across various specica-
tions.8 The corresponding gures for 1995 are 0.005 and 0.012.
These elasticities are in line with previously reported elasticities
which are surprisingly uniform across countries and time periods
using various sources of data. Previous studies report elasticities
ranging between 0.01-0.05.9
The lower elasticities for 1995 are a re
ection of an excep-
tional recession that occurred during the early 1990's in Sweden.
The period 1991-1995 is characterized by a large fall in GDP and
an increase of total unemployment from 5 to 15 percent. Average
prots for 1991-1994, used in the 1995 specication, therefore re-

ect employer's ability to pay, during a recessionary period, on
the wages of workers in 1995. In light of this economic crisis and
the concomitant increased fear of unemployment among work-
6For eects of capital intensity on wages, see Dickens and Katz (1987) on industry data
and Arai (1999) on matched worker-rm data.
7Results not reported in the tables can be obtained from the authors on request.
8The elasticities are computed by multiplying the estimated coecient for prots by
prot means. This elasticity is approximately equal to elasticities obtained when estimat-
ing log wages on log prots.
9Christodes and Oswald (1992) report elasticities of around 0.01 for Canada. The
elasticities in the Oswald and Sanfeys (1996) study on the US range between 0.02 and
0.05. Hildreth and Oswald (1997) report elasticities in the range of 0.02 to 0.04 for UK.
The corresponding range in Arai (1999) study on Sweden is 0.01 to 0.02.
7ers, we would not expect a higher degree of rent-extraction. For
this reason, we focus on the prot estimates for 1991.
Table 1. Eect of prot on wages. OLS estimates for 1991 and 1995 cross-
sections. Dependent variable is log monthly wage. Robust standard errors
in parenthesis.
1 2 3 4 5 6
1991 1991 1991 1995 1995 1995
Prot/Employee .093*** .054*** .040 *** .038*** .026*** .018***
(.002) (.002) (.002) (.001) (9E-04) (9E-04)
Female -.14*** -.13*** -.15*** -.15***
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
Experience .022*** .022*** .019*** .020***
(.0002) (.0002) (.0002) (.0002)
Experience2/100 -.04*** -.04*** -.03*** -.03***
(.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006)
Seniority/10 .008*** .007*** .031*** .024***
(.0008) (.0008) (.0008) (.0009)
Education level NO YES YES NO YES YES
Blue Collar -.10*** -.11*** -.16*** -.17***
(.0014) (.0013) (.0013) (.0013)
Industry NO NO YES NO NO YES
R2 0.01 0.44 0.45 0.01 0.48 0.49
Number of obs. 175 023 172 280 172 280 178 259 176 009 176 009
Notes: *** indicate signicance at 1%-level. Industry classication corre-
sponds to 14 industries.
The estimated coecient for average prots reported in col-
umn 1, Table 1 is 0.09 and given the mean value of prots per
employee of 0.27, the elasticity of wages with respect to prof-
its is 0.024. This elasticity is intact when including a dummy
variable for females but decreases by fty percent when we ac-
count for individual dierences in human capital and include a
blue-collar dummy (see column 2). Hence, systematic sorting of
8highly educated and experienced workers into more protable
rms accounts for half of the observed coecient for average
prots.
An issue to consider is that the prot per employee measure
does not vary for workers in the same rm. To control for group
eects, we estimate models correcting for within group corre-
lated errors as proposed by Moulton (1990) and run between-
rm regressions. Accounting for group eects leads to increased
standard errors but the prot coecient remains signicant at
the 1 percent level. We also include the capital-to-labor ratio
and rm size in our models while taking into account group ef-
fects. The prot eect is robust to inclusion of these variables.
To check the robustness of our results with respect to labor sup-
ply we also estimated the same models including only workers
who work more than 50 or 75 percent of full-time. These exper-
iments, not reported in the paper, leave the results unchanged.10
Variation Across Worker Groups
We also investigate whether the extent of rent sharing varies
across gender and occupational groups since the bargaining power
of workers may vary across these groups. Results are presented
in Table 2.
In column 1, an interaction variable between female and prof-
its is added. The estimate of this variable is negative and sig-
nicant implying that the extent of rent-sharing is substantially
lower for women. However, an interaction specication is not
appropriate for examining a gender rent-gap since there are sig-
nicant dierences in returns to human capital between men and
women.To take this into account and to examine rent-sharing
dierentials with respect to gender, we run separate regressions
for men and women(see columns 2 and 3).
10These sensitivity analyses are performed for all estimations reported in Table 1-5.
9Table 2. Variation of eect of prots on wages across gender and occupation.
Dependent variable is log monthly wage in 1991. Robust standard errors in
parenthesis.
1 2 3 4
All Men Women All
Prot/Employee .063*** .061*** .040*** .066***
(.002) (.002) (.002) (.003)
Female -.13 -.14
(.001) (.001)
Experience .022*** .024*** .017*** .022***
(.0002) (.0003) (.0004) (.0002)
Experience2/100 -.04*** -.046*** -.03*** -.04***
(.0006) (.0007) (.001) (.0006)
Seniority/10 .074*** .007*** .012*** .008***
(.0008) (.001) (.001) (.0008)
Education level YES YES YES YES
Blue Collar -.10*** -.15*** -.11*** -.010***





Industry NO NO NO NO
R2 0.44 0.43 0.33 0.44
Number of obs. 172 280 127 012 45 268 172 280
Notes: *** indicate signicance at 1%-level. Industry classication corre-
sponds to 14 industries. Estimating these models on data for 1995 yields
qualitatively the same results.
Results imply that the elasticities of wages with respect to
prots are 0.017 for men and 0.010 for women indicating sub-
stantial dierences in rents for these two groups of workers. To
check whether these rent dierentials re
ect the systematic sort-
ing of men and women across industries, we also add 2-digit
industry dummies. Adding the industry dummies lowers the
10impact of prots for both men and women but does not aect
the rent-gap implying lower rents for women within industries.11
Around 80 percent of blue collar workers and approximately
70 percent of white collar workers are unionized in Sweden. If
rent-sharing were only a consequence of collective bargaining,
we would expect to observe higher rents for blue-collar workers.
Examining the variation of rents across occupational groups,
classied as white- and blue-collar workers, indicate lower rents
for blue-collar workers (see column 4, Table 2). Running the
same regression, adding industry dummies yields results imply-
ing that the lower rents for blue collar workers is not due to
the systematic sorting of blue collar workers into dierent in-
dustries. Experiments with a similar model including an inter-
action between prots and manufacturing disclose that workers
in manufacturing receive signicantly lower rents in comparison
to workers in services. These results suggest that the existence
of rent-sharing is not related to the degree of unionization. The
lower rents for blue collar workers might partly re
ect the dif-
ferences in human capital across groups. Our regressions in-
cluding interaction variables between prots and human capital
variables indicate that the extent of rent-sharing increases with
level of education, experience and seniority. Individual bargain-
ing power might also increase with human capital and lead to
higher rents for workers characterized by higher skills.
Within and between Industry Eects
Another question to consider is the extent to which rent-sharing
takes place within industries. This is interesting given the collec-
tive bargaining system in Sweden where wages are bargained at
the industry level as the highest level of centralization. However,
due to a higher degree of coordination of unions and employer or-
11Arai (1999) report similar results for 1991 in Sweden using observed hourly wages and
the same measure for prots.
11ganizations, one might not expect substantial dierences across
industries. This view is conrmed by our results indicating that
the eect of prots drops roughly 25 percent when we add 14
industry dummies constructed such that they roughly capture
the dierent bargaining areas (see column 3 and 6 in Table 1 for
1991 and 1995, respectively).
Obviously, the magnitude of within industry eects depend
on the level of industry aggregation. Our 14 industries are more
aggregated than actual bargaining levels in Sweden. For ex-
ample the Swedish Central Organization of Blue-Collar Work-
ers (LO) is involved in approximately 25 negotiations. Using
a ner industry classication of 55 industries (2-digit SIC) re-
duces the within industry eect from 75 percent to 55 percent.
Actual industry-level wage bargaining in Sweden corresponds to
a level of aggregation falling in between the above mentioned
levels of industry classication. This means that the fraction of
overall rents due to local bargaining lies somewhere between 55
and 75 percent. These local eects consist of bargaining at the
rm/establishment and individual level.
A remaining question then is how large a part of within in-
dustry eects can be attributed to between-rm, within industry
eects and how large a part to rent-sharing between individuals
within rms in a given industry. To examine these issues we
estimate between-rm within industry eects by running WLS
regressions on transformed data of rm averages, controlling for
industry dummies. The between-rm eects are about 70 per-
cent of the within industry eects. These eects correspond
to a specication where we also control for blue-collar status
and thus represent rent-dierentials within broad occupational
groups. Excluding the blue- collar dummy reduces the share of
the local bargaining eect attributed to individual bargaining
to around 60 percent.
Our results are in line with what is usually perceived as the
magnitude of wage drift in Sweden indicating the relative im-
12portance of local bargaining in Sweden.12. The major part of
rent-sharing is attributed to rm/establishment and individual
level bargaining. According to our results, more than a half of
rent-sharing takes place within industries. Two third of these
eects are attributed to rm dierences and the remaining 1/3
is the result of within rm variation.
5 Individual Heterogeneity and Endogeneity
Cross section estimation, such as those reported above, ignores
several potential problems. Unobserved individual heterogene-
ity may lead to overestimation of the prot eect on wages if
high ability workers earn higher wages and are sorted into high
prot rms. The fact that we cannot control for all relevant pro-
ductivity measures in our cross-section estimation implies that
our prot estimates may suer from an omitted ability bias. In
order to deal with this problem, we run xed-eect models. By
running individual xed-eects regressions we are able to control
for unobserved individual heterogeneity.
The individual xed-eects model estimated on data for 1991
and 1995 yields a positive and signicant prot coecient (see
Table 3).13 The period 1991-1995, as mentioned above, rep-
resents the severest economic crisis in Sweden since the 1930's.
During such a recession, it is not self-evident that wage increases
should strongly follow prot increases in light of the general
employment insecurity due to shut-downs and increasing unem-
ployment.
Fixed-eects estimation aggregates the prot eect for those
individuals who were working in the same rm 1991 and 1995, as
well as for those who changed employer. It is reasonable to as-
12The wage drift is calculated as a residual dierence between the centrally negotiated
wages and the nal wage outcome. See National Institute of Economic Research (Kon-
junkturinstitutet) quarterly reports for 1991-1995.
13Notice that almost all individual variables are time invariant and therefore not
included.
13sume that employer switches during this period are exogenous
due to the high unemployment rates at the time. Results on
gross worker 
ows for this period in Sweden indicate that both
worker turnover as well as excess worker reallocation, i.e. the dif-
ference between worker and job turnover, decreased drastically
during the early 1990's (See Arai and Heyman (2000)). This
implies few voluntary job switches during this period. Another
issue is to check whether prot eects on wages are stronger in
rms experiencing a prot increase between the two periods.14
Table 3. Eect of prot on wages. Results from individual xed-eects mod-
els for the 1991-95 panel. Dependent variable is log monthly wage. Standard
errors in parentheses.
1 2 3
All Prot/Employee> 0 Prot/Employee > 0
Prot/Employee .0069*** .022*** .034 ***
(9E-04) (.002) (.002)
Conditioning on same NO NO YES
employer -91 and -95
Hausman test 354*** 38*** 13***
Breusch & Pagan test 65,542*** 33,066*** 25,364***
R2 (overall) 0.004 0.004 0.001
Number of obs. 187 364 100 022 66 374
Notes: *** indicate signicance at 1%-level.
Estimating the xed eects model on a sub-sample of workers
who experienced an increase in prots in their employing rm,
leads to a four times higher estimate of prots with a t-statistics
14Our prot measure does not refer to the dierence in prots in 1991 and 1995 but
represents the dierence in average prots between the two periods 1987-1990 and 1991-
1994. The workers who's employing rm in the later period has lower prots than the
former period can hardly be expected to experience falling wages due to wage setting
institutions which almost entirely exclude wage cuts.
14of 18.64, indicating a high signicance level (see column 2 in Ta-
ble 3). Furthermore we restricted the estimation to workers who
remained at the same rm between the two years, to obtain a
within individual and rm eect estimate. Running the model
on this group of workers yields basically the same results indi-
cating that there are no signicant dierences between workers
who switched rms and those who didn't (see column 3 in Table
3). The message of these results is that rents exist and are not
due to xed individual and rm eects.
Instrumenting Prots
Next we turn to an examination of the possibility that high
wages lead to high prots, as predicted by eciency wage the-
ory together with imperfect competition in the product market,
or that higher wages reduce prots as measured in the rms'
balance sheet reports. Abowd and Lemieux (1993) use inter-
national selling prices as instruments and nd that the eect
of prots on wages rises by ten times. This at least indicates
that the rent-sharing eect might be underestimated due to the
accounting relationship between wages and prots. Another in-
strument used in the previous literature is energy costs (Blanch-

ower et al. (1996)). We run regressions instrumenting average
prots with lagged values of prots separately for dierent lags.
Results reported in columns 1-4 in Table 4 conrm that lagged
prots aect wages.
Furthermore, we use new instruments for prots based on
establishment level data matched with our data, that includes
explicit information on demand elasticity in the product market
and the degree of competition. Firms were asked to report a
predicted sales response for the next 6 months to a hypothetical
product price increase of 10 percent. Four categories were avail-
able ranging from essentially unchanged sales to a more than
10 % drop in sales. Reported answers to this question gives us
15a short term product demand elasticity ranging between 0 and
above 1 as an indicator of rm's product market power.
Table 4. Eects of prot on wages, instrumental variable estimates using
various instruments. Dependent variable is log monthly wage in 1991. Robust
standard errors in parentheses.




















Prot/Employee .066*** .11*** .099*** .082*** .28*** .36***









Education level NO NO NO NO YES YES
Blue collar -.089*** -.085***
(.002) (.002)
Industry NO NO NO NO YES YES
R2 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.37 0.32
Number of obs. 124 364 160 070 169 902 174 297 89 009 88 498
Notes:
i) *** indicate signicance at 1%-level. Industry classication corresponds
to 14 industries.
ii) Results in 1-4 are robust for including individual characteristics and in-
dustry aliation. Column 5 and 6 are based on a subsample of the original
matched data due to missing values for our instruments. The estimate for
4-year average prots based on the remaining sample is not signicantly dif-
ferent from the estimate when using the original sample.
iii) Using lagged instruments for 1991,1992,1993 or 1994 for estimating the
eect of prots in 1991-1994 on wages in 1995 we obtain basically the same
results except when prot in 1992 is used as instrument. The instruments in
column 5 and 6 are not available for 1995.
16Another indicator, available in our data, of rm market power
is the number of important competitors in the product market
which is measured in four classes: f1;2   5;6   10;> 10g. Us-
ing these two variables as instruments for prots in separate
specications, rent sharing estimates increase radically by ap-
proximately ten times. The implied elasticities from these es-
timations are as high as 0.1. This implies that more than half
of the wage inequality in Sweden is due to the spread of prots
according to Lester' s 'range of pay'. Our conclusion is that
using observed prots to estimate rents tends to underestimate
the impact of rent sharing.
6 Unemployment Risk
In previous sections, we examined the impact of rms' ability to
pay on wages without taking into account how unemployment
levels might aect the extent to which high prots lead to high
wages. The extent of rent-sharing depends also on individuals
fear (risk) of unemployment. The bargaining outcome partially
depends on the probability of obtaining a new job in the event of
job-loss. This is especially important when comparing the extent
of rent sharing between two time periods that are characterized
by extremely dierent levels of aggregate unemployment.
Previous studies on the wage curve report a stable statisti-
cal relation between unemployment and wages where unemploy-
ment is measured on aggregated industry, region, or national
levels (see Blanch
ower and Oswald (1994)). Few microdata
studies estimate both the impact of prots and unemployment
on wages.15 The unemployment risk for a group of workers is
however not uniformly distributed across rms and workers. To
examine the heterogeneity across rms and individuals with re-
spect to unemployment and thereby to study the eect of un-
15See Blanch
ower et al. (1996) based on industry unemployment and prots, and Arai
(1999) based on rm prots and regional unemployment.
17employment on wages, one needs to link unemployment risks to
individual employees and to rms. Since by denition rms do
not contain unemployed workers, unemployment must necessar-
ily be measured as the expected unemployment risk for a worker
or a group of workers within a rm.
Individual heterogeneity concerning unemployment risk may
aect wages in two manners. First, individuals with a high ex-
pected unemployment risk might have weaker bargaining power.
Second, the behavior of individuals in a wage bargaining situa-
tion can be in
uenced by the expected unemployment risk for
other workers within the same rm. The rst mechanism is re-
lated to individual wage bargaining and the second is associated
with rm and establishment wage bargaining.
Using our unemployment measures combined with the 1995
data simply captures experienced unemployment and would rep-
resent expected unemployment risk under perfectly adaptive ex-
pectations. The interpretation of our unemployment measures
combined with the 1991 data is not, however, straightforward.
Individuals could not have foreseen the crises of the early 1990's
when bargaining on wages prior to 1991, and therefore could
not have based their negotiations on adequately predicted fu-
ture unemployment risks. Using actual unemployment records,
however, might reasonably capture the relative fragility of indi-
viduals to employment shocks and thus their relative bargain-
ing success. The unemployment experience during 1992-1995
used in estimation on 1991 data corresponds to unemployment
risk based on perfect foresight. The workers' expectations can
reasonably be assumed to be somewhere in between perfectly
adaptive expectations and perfect foresight. Obtaining similar
estimates of expected unemployment risk measured in these two
ways would be an indication of a stable eect of expected un-
employment on wages.
18Table 5. Eects of prots and unemployment on dierent aggregation levels
on wages. OLS estimates for cross sections in 1991 and 1995. Dependent
variable is log monthly wage. Standard errors corrected for within rm (or
3-digit industry in 3 and 6) correlated errors in parenthesis.
1 2 3 4 5 6
1991 1991 1991 1995 1995 1995
Prots/Employee .048** .045*** .022*** .023***
(.02) (.002) (.007) (.006)
Female -.12*** -.12*** -.12*** -.12*** -.12*** -.12***
(.01) (.006) (.01) (.01) (.007) (.01)
Experience .02*** .02*** .02*** .02*** 02*** .02***
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
Experience2/100 -.04*** -.04*** -. 04*** -.03*** {.03*** -.03***
(.003) (.003) (.003) (.002) (.002) (.003)
Seniority/10 .001 .002 .001 .007 .008 .007
(.005) (.005) (.006 (.005) (.005) (.007)
Education level YES YES YES YES YES YES
Unemployment
Firm level (log) -.02** -.02*** -.04*** -.04***
(.007) (.007) (.006) (.007)
Industry levela(log) -.02** -.05***
(.01) (.01)
Individual -.04*** -.04*** -.04*** -.08*** -.08*** -.08***
(.004) (.004) (.004) (.005) (.005) (.007)
R2 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.45 0.44 0.45
No. of obs. 163 722 163 722 166 215 167 272 167 272 170 172
Notes:
** indicate signicance at 5%-level and *** at 1%-level.
a Results are for unemployment aggregated at 3-digit industry levels. Using
aggregated unemployment at 5-digit industry level yields basically the same
results.
Results on the impact of unemployment risk at the individual
and aggregate levels on wages for 1991 and 1995 are reported
in Table 5. Our various specications indicate that both the
individual and rm unemployment variable is negatively and
19signicantly correlated to wages.16 The results are similar when
estimating this specication for 1991 and 1995, the unemploy-
ment variable measures expected (perfect foresight) relative un-
employment risk in the 1991 estimation and expected (adaptive)
unemployment when estimating on data for 1995. The impact of
the individual unemployment measure on wages means that low-
skilled workers have lower wages and usually experience higher
unemployment risks.
Results in Table 5 indicate that there is a negative eect of
aggregate rm and industry unemployment risk on individual
wages once we have controlled for rm prots, human capital
and individual heterogeneity in unemployment risks, measured
as expected or experienced unemployment. This allows us to in-
terpret the eect of the aggregate unemployment variable as the
eect of unemployment on wages in a rm/establishment bar-
gaining context. The eect of unemployment on wages is some-
what stronger in 1995 compared to 1991. This might re
ect the
crises of the early nineties and/or the dierent eciency of our
unemployment measures in capturing individual unemployment
risk. The elasticities of wages with respect to unemployment
cannot easily be compared to previous estimates on the unem-
ployment eect on wages using more aggregated unemployment
data. What we nd important here is that the worker wage
seems to be negatively correlated to co-workers' unemployment
experiences. Such an eect most likely goes through the local
wage bargaining process.
A good indicator of employment uncertainty associated with
jobs in a rm is the rms prot levels during the previous years.
This implies that prots and an aggregated unemployment mea-
sure at the rm level are strongly correlated. This is conrmed
by negative and highly signicant raw correlation between prof-
16We also experimented with specications (not reported here) including only a rm
unemployment measure in which the rm eect decreases from -0.02 to -0.03 for 1991 and
from -0.04 to -0.05 in 1995.
20its and aggregated rm unemployment. The Pearson correlation
is -0.21 for 1991 and -0.14 for 1995. The corresponding rank cor-
relation is -0.20 and -0.24 for 1991 and 1995 respectively. Adding
the unemployment measures to our basic specication for 1991
leads to a drop of the prots estimate from 0.06 to 0.05. The cor-
responding gures for 1995 are 0.03 and 0.02 (compare Table 1
and Table 5).
Our results conrm a stable and negative correlation between
aggregate unemployment and wages along with signicant pos-
itive eects of prots. The estimates for prots and unemploy-
ment vary somewhat across specications but are basically of the
same magnitude regardless of the level of aggregation. These re-
sults add to previous empirical work on the wage curve in that
they examine the relationship between aggregate unemployment
and wages taking into account that marginal workers have both
lower wages and higher unemployment risk. Moreover, these
results examine the sensitivity of the impact of unemployment
on wages at various aggregation levels from the rm to industry
levels. The evidence presented here indicate that prots and
unemployment aect wages.
7 Conclusions
In this paper we report elasticities of wages with respect to prof-
its, based on a large matched worker-rm dataset, in the range
of 0.01 and 0.03. The signicant and positive eect of prots
on wages is robust to controls for worker and rm xed eects,
the impact of unemployment risk on wages and the endogene-
ity of prots. The major part of these rents are found within
industries and two thirds of the within industry eect can be
attributed to between rm eects while the remainder is due to
within rm eects.
We report elasticities of wages with respect to prots imply-
ing that wage inequality in Sweden due to the spread in prots
21is as high as 14 percent of mean wages in 1991, according to
Lester's range of pay. Using a measure of product demand elas-
ticity as an instrument for prots leads to an increase in the
prot estimate and yield elasticities in the magnitude of 10 per-
cent implying a Lesters range of pay of 50 percent.
To investigate the impact of workers' unemployment risk on
wages we construct a measure of individual unemployment risk
by using information on workers' unemployment experience dur-
ing 1992-1995. We reported results suggesting that aggregate
unemployment risk at the rm as well as at 3-, 4- and 5-digit
industry levels is negatively correlated to individual wages. The
eect of our aggregate measures dier from earlier evidence on
the wage curve in that the estimates represent eects after con-
trolling for rms' ability to pay and individual worker hetero-
geneity in unemployment risk.
The message of these results is that prots and unemploy-
ment aect wages in economies with very dierent institutional
settings. Our results for Sweden are similar to results reported
for the US and UK despite the fact that Sweden constitutes
an extreme in regards to degree of unionization and extended
labor protection laws in comparison to these countries. Rent-
sharing seems to be an integral part of wage setting in capitalist
economies regardless of institutional setting.
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Wages: Monthly pre-tax full-time equivalent wages in 1990
prices (using CPI) based on Swedish Trade Union Confeder-
ation (LO) and the Swedish Employers' Confederation (SAF)
wage data and completed with the income registers from Statis-
tics Sweden (SCB).
Unemployment: Information on unemployment history dur-
ing 1992-95 according to the National Labor Market Board's
Event Database (AMS H andelsedatabas) containing individual
records of all individuals who have registered as unemployed
at the labor oces. Registering as unemployed is a necessary
condition for being eligible for unemployment benets as well as
having the possibility of participating in labor market programs.
Demography variables:
Gender and Age are from SCB's Population Census ( Registret
 over totalbefolkningen).
Human Capital variables:
Education level dummies are based on 2 digit level of the
Swedish Education Nomenclature (SUN-codes) from the Swedish
Education Register (Utbildningsregistret). These are Elemen-
tary School (less than 9 years), Compulsory School, Upper Sec-
ondary School< 3 (at most 2 years), Upper Secondary School
 3 , Long Upper Secondary School (3-4 years), College (Shorter
University Education) and University.
Experience is number of years on the labor market according
to the Employment Register (Syssels attningsregistret).
Seniority is number of years at the establishment based on
tracing the individual back to 1986 in the Employment Register
(Syssels attningsregistret). Individuals having more than 6 years
of seniority are given the mean seniority in Sweden according to
the Level of Living Survey in 1991, i.e. 16 years.
25Industry and Occupational Groups:
Industry dummies based on the 2-digit SIC (SNI69). Own
classication of 14 industries as well as three and ve digit in-
dustry classication.
Blue- and White-collar worker according to the Population
and Housing Census of 1990 (FoB90). These refer to occupation
classication in 1990 and not necessarily at the current employ-
ment.
Balance sheet information:
Prots (Swedish kronor in 1990 prices) is dened as annual
prots after capital depreciation. Available for the period 1987-
95 (MM Partners). In estimations on the matched sample we
remove 143 rms in 1991 with four-year average (1987-1990)
prot-per-employee below -53,300 (the 1st percentile) and above
261,000 (the 99th percentile) percentile. For the data from 1995
we remove 119 rms with four-year (1991-1994) average prot-
per-employee below -128,000 (the 1st percentile) and above 890,000
(the 99th percentile). In one case an annual observation of
18,000,000,000 for 1995 were replaced by averages in the other
years. These extreme values are most likely due to measurement
errors in the prots or rm-size variables. The remaining sample
consists of 6932 rms in 1991 and 5757 in 1995.
Number of employees refer to average number of employees
available for the period 1987-95 (MM Partners).
Information from the Swedish Establishment Survey (APU):
Demand elasticity. If your company raised prices with 10
percent, how would then demand be aected in six months? (i)
Stay the same (or increase), (ii) Reduced, around 5%, (iii) Re-
duced, around 10%, (iv) Reduced, more than 10%.
Number of competitors. How many important competitors
does your rm have? (i) 1, (ii) 2-5, (iii) 6-10, (iv) > 10.
26Table A.1. Sample Means for individuals in the matched sam-
ple.
1991 1995
N Mean SD N Mean SD
Log monthly wage 175 023 9.43 .26 178 259 9.52 .30
Female 175 023 .26 178 259 .29
Experience 175 023 17 9.97 178 259 19 10.26
Seniority 173 226 8 6.66 176 499 10 6.92
Blue Collar 175 023 .64 178 259 .53
Education level:
Elementary School < 9 174 059 .16 177 761 .11
Compulsory School =9 174 059 .14 177 761 .13
Upper Secondary School < 3 174 059 .35 177 761 .34
Upper Secondary School 3 174 059 .16 177 761 .17
Upper Secondary School > 3 174 059 .11 177 761 .14
College < 3 174 059 .08 177 761 .11
University 174 059 .004 177 761 .006
Individual unemployment 168 982 .27 172 274 .21
Prots/Employee, 100.000 SEK 175 023 .27 33.9 178 259 .33 63.5
Size 175 023 6081 9456 178 259 3561 4940
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